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Introduction
This paper analyses the relationship and the structure of possible conflicts between multiculturalism and secularism. This task is motivated by a development in discussions about multiculturalism, which have increasingly (especially in Europe) focused on religious minorities (particularly Muslims). Multiculturalism denotes positions about how to handle societal diversity that argue for accommodation of minority groups. When multiculturalism focuses on religious groups, the accommodation in question is of religious practices, and claims for accommodation increasingly appeal to the religious importance of such practices. Examples of this include cases such as exemptions from animal welfare requirements for halal or kosher butchering, the permissibility of religious symbols and clothing in public settings, public support for minority faith schools, permissions for the building of mosques and minarets, and public consultations with and recognition of organised minority faith communities. In such cases, multiculturalists argue in favour of exemptions, permissions, support and recognition.
This development threatens to conflict with secularism requiring separation of politics and religion. This possible conflict leads to a criticism of multiculturalism different from conservative or nationalist objections, since secularism is often a liberal view appealing to human rights and enlightenment values (Levey, 2009; Triandafyllidou, Modood and Meer, 2012: 7-10 ).
The aim of this paper is to use the examination of this possible conflict to focus on the general understandings of multiculturalism and secularism, and to show how multiculturalism and secularism can be and are understood in quite different ways. I argue that some of these understandings are more plausible and fruitful than others. I focus on the general structure of theoretical understandings of multiculturalism and secularism and show how some of these provide richer theoretical resources for understanding and discussing accommodation of religious minorities. The aim is to explicate general theoretical understandings of multiculturalism and secularism that do not foreclose normative debates about religious accommodation and provide us with theoretical categories and tools that can be used to structure and conduct the normative debate.
I start by explaining why there might be a conflict between multiculturalism and secularism. I then consider two common understandings of multiculturalism, one as a label for a specific set of policies and one as a view defined as 'going beyond' liberalism, and note some problems with them. I then propose a more general understanding of multiculturalism as accommodation of minorities, which need not be understood as a view going beyond liberalism but rather as an interpretation of basic liberal values and principles. I go through a similar exercise in relation to secularism, during which I also reject understandings of secularism as simply a label of policies and as a specifically liberal view. Again I suggest a more general and structural understanding of secularism. In the conclusion, I sketch how the two proposed understandings of multiculturalism and secularism provide a framework for discussing possible conflicts. This approach shows that the conflict between multiculturalism and secularism is not a general one, but 3 rather one that can appear in very specific respects depending on which particular claims are inserted into the general understandings of the two positions, and how the conflicts might not be as many or as intractable as one might otherwise think.
Why there might be conflicts between multiculturalism and secularism
The idea of separation, i.e. that politics and religion should operate in their respective spheres without either unduly influencing the other, is prominent in the history of liberal political thought and in the self-understanding of many contemporary liberals. But at this level of description, the idea of separation is extremely vague and mostly metaphorical -everything here depends on what we understand by 'politics', 'religion' and 'separation'. But the idea of separation is also connected to more specific political principles dear to liberals, such as freedom of religion, non-discrimination and state neutrality. Principles like these concern the relationship between religion and politics and give more practical expression to the idea of separation (Audi, 2000: 32-33) . Religious freedom for instance requires the state not to interfere in religious practices, within certain limits, which is one way to cash out the idea of separation in one particular respect.
Another idea about politics and religion is that the state should engage with, actively make room for and even support religion. Religion is extremely important to many people, for whom it has political implications, and politics cannot but affect people's opportunities to live in accordance with their religious beliefs. The state should therefore actively recognise religion. The general idea of recognition is also very broad -for present purposes it signifies a quite open category of possible relations between state and religion involving active engagement by both parties, public expression of acknowledgement or even affirmation, and acts of support, or even delegation of rights and powers (Laegaard, 2012: 199-201) . Just as the idea of separation, the idea of recognition is also associated with more concrete political expressions, e.g. state consultation procedures with religious organisations (faith communities etc.), exemptions of religious minorities from rules that interfere with their religious practices, and state subsidies for certain religious activities. In such cases, the state does not keep its distance from religious actors or ignore how policies affect religious groups, as the idea of separation seems to require. Rather, the state actively engages with and supports certain groups, not despite of the fact that they are religious but because they are religious, and gives special consideration to the category of religion in the assessment of the impact of its policies.
Given these two ideal types of politics-religion relations the possibility of conflicts between secularism and multiculturalism appears if we consider how multiculturalism has developed recently, especially in Europe. Whereas multiculturalism in countries like Canada originally concerned indigenous groups and national minorities defined on the basis of language, ethnicity and culture (Kymlicka, 1995) , multiculturalism in Europe is different. Euromulticulturalism has first of all been concerned with diversity due to immigration. And this diversity has increasingly been understood, not in terms of culture, but in terms of religion -'multiculturalism' in Europe is now primarily a label for discussions about Muslims (Levey, 2009; Triandafyllidou, Modood and Meer, 2012; Laegaard, 2014a) .
1 When we combine this development with the idea of recognition, the possible conflict between secularism and multiculturalism emerges:
Multiculturalism seems to require a kind of recognition of religious minorities and practices that might contradict the separation required by secularism (Kymlicka, 2015: 30) .
The policy approach to multiculturalism
We should distinguish between multiculturalism as a description of the demographic diversity of societies and as a label for how societies respond politically to this diversity. One common 
The relational understanding of multiculturalism
A standard understanding of multiculturalism is that principles and policies count as multicultural if and to the extent that they go beyond standard liberal rights and duties. Multiculturalism has been understood, both by proponents (e.g. Taylor, 1994; Kymlicka, 1995) Since questions about what liberalism means, permits and requires are hugely controversial, and perhaps even essentially contested issues, the relational definition of multiculturalism is arguably theoretically unhelpful in at least two ways: a) it presupposes a settled definition of liberalism, which might not be had at all, and b) it might be trying to define something relatively less unclear (what multiculturalism is) in terms of something relatively more unclear (what liberalism is). These are reasons for looking for another understanding of multiculturalism.
The accommodationist understanding of multiculturalism
A broader understanding of multiculturalism that avoids the problems of the relational definition is that multiculturalism denotes 'policies designed to provide some level of public recognition, support or accommodation to non-dominant ethnocultural groups' (Kymlicka, 2007: 16) .
Multiculturalism is about 'the legal and political accommodation of ethnic diversity' justified as 'a vehicle for replacing older forms of ethnic and racial hierarchy with new relations of democratic citizenship' (Kymlicka, 2012: 1) . Such definitions make accommodation the central point of multiculturalism and are not relational in the way previously discussed.
On On a relational definition, liberal rights must be taken as settled, since the meaning of multiculturalism will otherwise be indeterminate. Liberal rights are normally taken to be individual rights that everybody enjoys in the same form and to the same extent. So whatever protection a liberal right affords is extended equally to everybody and is not a matter of multicultural accommodation. The right to freedom of religion, for instance, is an individual right to freedom of conscience, belief and observance, including the freedom to assemble with others for worship and to manifest one's religion in public and private. The right is constrained in the same way for everybody by respect for the rights of others and by sufficiently weighty public aims, e.g. concerns of security or public order, which have the same weight in all cases. Any kind of accommodation not provided by this uniform liberal right to freedom of religion, e.g. forms of communal autonomy regarding family law or exemptions from generally applicable laws, constitutes multicultural recognition because it goes beyond liberalism.
On the accommodationist understanding of multiculturalism, on the other hand, liberal rights to freedom of religion are an important form of multicultural accommodation (of religious minorities) rather than a liberal residue that multiculturalism defines itself as having progressed beyond. Contrary to what relational definitions must assume (on pain of indeterminacy), the liberal right to freedom of religion is not settled -it is rather not only (as a matter of fact) an object of recurring political controversy but also (as a matter of principle) an object of continuous legal specification, extension and reinterpretation in light of new empirical developments. Religious freedom might at one point (e.g. in a historically predominantly protestant country) be taken simply to concern freedom of belief and the right to assemble with others for worship (i. Muslim headscarves, can often be described in two different ways:
1. As a matter of special accommodation of religion, e.g. because religion is especially important or valuable, or because religion plays a particularly important role for group identity. The policy or rule is then seen as an exemption or departure from generally applicable rules, which therefore requires a special justification.
2. As a matter of interpreting a general right or principle in an accommodative way, e.g.
because the underlying interest being protected by the right or principle requires a new form of protection in a new case. The policy or rule is then seen, not as a departure, but as an application of the same underlying aim or protective interest in a new case.
These two representations connect to the relational and the accommodationist definition of multiculturalism, respectively. But they also differ importantly, both at the level of framing and at the level of theory, in ways that speak in favour of the second representation and thereby for the accommodationist understanding of multiculturalism.
Representations of rules or policies as special accommodation connects to the relational definition of multiculturalism because accommodation only is 'special' in relation to 
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The interpretative representation permits the framing of multicultural accommodation as ordinary and unexceptional -it suggests that the same rights and rules that everybody else already enjoy and have to respect also apply in the case of new minority groups, but that differences in circumstances might mean that the practical implications are different.
The most important difference, however, is at the theoretical level. Here, the two representations express different ideas about the object and structure of justification:
The special accommodation characterisation suggests that accommodation provides particular groups with some benefit (e.g. a permission and the resulting freedom) denied to others.
Such special benefits stand in need of justification and such justification presupposes that there is something special about the group. This is the case both at the level of accommodation of religion in general (the debate about whether 'religion is special') and specific minority groups (debates about whether Muslims make special claims).
The interpretative characterisation rather presents justification as application of a general rule to a particular case. The object of justification is a decision regarding how to treat a specific group. In that sense the object of justification is particular. But it is not 'special' if the justification for the particular treatment of the group makes reference to a general right or rule. Here is a possible representation of such a process of interpretation and the corresponding structure of justification:
This representation is purely formal and only concerns the structure of a form of political argument. It does not say anything about the metaphysical status of the values on which the rights and rules are based or about the type of justification required. So the structure can be compatible with a non-metaphysical Rawlsian political liberalism or a non-foundationalist approach to political justification.
Basic values:
The system of rights and rules is assumed to be based on values of a fundamental and general nature which (although often implicit) explain what is normatively significant, e.g. appeals to 'human dignity' and axiological statements about value.
Interests and aims:
The basic values provide reasons for which interests and other aims should be protected or promoted. These interests and aims are the purposes of rules and rights. They are sometimes, but not always, mentioned in statements of rules and rights.
Rights and regulatory principles:
The interests and aims then give rise to rights and regulatory principles (rules), which are prescriptions regulating the conduct of agents in ways supposed to protect or further the relevant interests and aims. Because rights and regulatory principles are instruments serving specific purposes their justification must also take empirical conditions into account -a right is only justified if it in fact, under relevant circumstances, protects or promotes the interests it is supposed to protect or promote.
Priorities and limiting conditions:
Since there are always many separate interests and aims, systems of rights and regulatory principles must specify the relative priority of different rights (e.g. hierarchies of constitutional and legislative rights) or competing considerations that can limit or affect what a right or principle requires in practice (e.g. limiting clauses in human rights statements).
5.
Application: Rights and regulatory principles are then applied in particular cases to determine whether a right applies to a given case and, if so, what exactly it requires here.
Application is not a matter of mechanically deriving statements about particular cases from general formulations of rights; application is an exercise of judgement requiring agents to take a number of different considerations into account: i) the limiting clauses and prioritisations affect the implications for specific cases, e.g.
because other rights apply in the case and have a higher priority, or because other considerations apply against which rights must be weighed;
ii) empirical facts co-determine what a particular right means in a given case, and the right itself comes with empirical presuppositions which might no longer hold or should be supplemented with considerations of new facts not previously taken into account;
iii) which facts to take into account depends on what best serves the underlying interests or aims which justify rights in the first place; and iv) how to weigh different rights and considerations against each other requires attention to how different prioritisations and weightings fare in the light of the basic values underlying the entire system.
Even though this structure of justification is general and can be projected on to a broad range of normative systems regardless of their specific object and content, it is relevant to multiculturalism:
The point of the accommodationist understanding precisely is that multicultural accommodation need not be something special -and that the same justificatory structure therefore applies here as to other normative claims. This is what is denied by the relational understanding and the accompanying representation of multiculturalism as special.
The structure of justification clearly does not say anything about minority groups or accommodation (it is, after all, just a structure and in that sense formal). But ideas central to multiculturalism fit into and can be represented within the structure of justification.
Debates about multiculturalism are responses to the presence of diversity and difference. While this is sometimes represented in multicultural theories and rhetoric as something of intrinsic importance, a more plausible way to think of it is as a change in empirical background 15 conditions and in the resulting effects of rules on people: accommodation has become an issue because established ways of ordering the relationship between politics and religion are challenged by the presence of religious minorities due to immigration. Another central multicultural idea is the claim that established rules are not neutral. Such claims usually concern the actual effects of specific rules, e.g. language requirements, clothing regulations, animal welfare requirements or criteria for public subsidies.
My suggestion is that multicultural calls for accommodation can be plausibly (Laegaard, 2008: 294-95) . Accommodation is then simply an application of a rule to a case in a way that takes account of such changes in empirical circumstances so as to make the implications of the rule less intrusive or more supportive relative to aims and interests that are relevant within the model.
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The liberal understanding of secularism 10 'Less intrusive or more supportive' are of course comparative notions, but this comparison is internal to the system of rights and rules -it is a comparison of how well different ways of translating interests into rules and applying them to cases fare in terms of protecting the interests in question.
Since the paper concerns the relationship between multiculturalism and secularism, I now turn to the understanding of secularism.
The also have views about separation of politics and religion, and there is no reason not to think of these as including or giving rise to conceptions of secularism (Laegaard, 2013b) . For these reasons we
should not define secularism merely as the liberal view about politics and religion.
The policy approach to secularism
Another understanding of secularism rather defines it as a label for specific policies or institutional mechanisms regarding politics and religion, e.g. the separation of church and state. This policy approach leaves it open what the reason for adopting such policies or mechanisms might be.
Therefore it can accept the point noted above that we encounter non-liberal secularist claims. Tariq Modood's discussion of multiculturalism and secularism, which focuses on institutional links between state and organised religions, apparently assumes a policy approach.
Modood argues for extending the privileges already granted by the British state to the Anglican Church to organisations minority religions. This 'institutional integration approach ' (2007: 79) can be squared with secularism, according to Modood, if we think of secularism not in terms of 'absolute' separation but as 'moderate secularism', which is defined as 'the relative autonomy of politics so that political authority, public reasoning and citizenship does not depend on upon shared religious conviction and motivation ' (2007: 73) .
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The policy approach understands secularism mainly as a label for policies and institutional mechanisms of separation. Modood's moderate secularism as an instance of this approach consists in a gradualist interpretation of the requirements of institutional separation, motivated as a response to the problem that 'secularism simpliciter appears to be an obstacle to integration and equality ' (2007: 78) , i.e. the earlier noted problem that multicultural accommodation of religious minorities seems to clash with requirements of separation of politics and religion. is unhelpful in much the same way as the first understanding of secularism, namely that it does not tell us, but rather presupposes that we already know, what secularism requires.
Secondly, the policy approach is a theoretically uninteresting understanding of secularism, because it does not tell us why church and state should be separated. Modood's discussion mainly diagnoses an important problem and offers a descriptive typology of understandings of secularism but does not systematically discuss normative justifications for secularism. Modood's gradualist solution to the conflict between multiculturalism and secularism therefore remains theoretically unsatisfactory, since it presupposes that nothing of normative importance is lost by down-grading requirements of separation -this might be true, but we cannot know without knowing why and to what extent politics and religion should be separated in the first place.
For these reasons we should not understand secularism merely as a label for specific policies or institutional mechanisms either. But on the basis of the faults with the liberal understanding and the policy approach, we can now see some desiderata for a helpful and theoretically interesting understanding of secularism: a) it has to define secularism in general terms and b) in a way that includes the justificatory structure of conceptions of secularism.
The structural understanding of secularism
The two desiderata suggest that secularism has to be understood as a multi-level view. On the one hand, secularism has as its object the regulation of the relationship between politics and religion; on the other hand, secularism includes a justification for the proposed regulatory policies or measures.
Our understanding of secularism should be sensitive both to the normative implications and to the justifications offered for them. But neither uniquely and conclusively define secularism since there can be justifications for secularist policies from a range of different theoretical premises (e.g. liberal My proposal is that the general concept is defined by the general object (the relation between politics and religion), and the general structure of justification. Particular conceptions are defined by inserting particular values and principles in this structure, which generate specific normative implications, e.g. specific policies and institutional mechanisms. Normative discussions of secularism concern these particular conceptions.
This understanding of secularism is analogous to the earlier proposed accommodationist and interpretative understanding of multiculturalism. This is not a coincidence, since the reasons for structural-interpretative understandings are similar in the two cases. The 12 I propose this as a theoretical understanding of secularism which might function as a tool for interpreting and categorising political views and arguments as cases of secularism and provide a framework for subsequent critical discussion of the views and arguments in question. I neither claim that this is what people making such arguments themselves understand by secularism (so it is a non-intentional interpretative tool), nor that the justifications offered are in fact good ones (the interpretation of views as conceptions of secularism is precisely intended to provide a frame for investigating and discussing whether they are sound and plausible).
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understandings are similar both in focusing on the justificatory structures and by mainly limiting the extension of multiculturalism and secularism, respectively, by a general specification of the object and the kind of normative implications of the justifications: a justificatory structure counts as multicultural if it generates policies of minority accommodation and as secularist if it yields requirements of separation of religion and politics.
Are these understandings too broad and permissive? Should our understandings of multiculturalism and secularism not only be anchored by limits on the normative 'output', but also on the 'input', i.e. the kinds of values and other premises that can be inserted into the structures?
One proposal might be that multiculturalism is always an egalitarian position, which simply insists that equality requires minority accommodation (cf. Laegaard, 2013a understanding of secularism, we should be wary of defining secularism exclusively in statist terms, which would replicate the rigid perspective of the policy approach.
Conclusion
The structural-interpretative understandings proposed here have implications for the question regarding the possible conflict between multiculturalism and secularism. Both understandings involve a distinction between a general and mostly formal concept and more specific and normatively substantive conceptions of multiculturalism and secularism. So potential conflicts between multiculturalism and secularism are not general or conceptual but only obtain for specific 23 conceptions and in specific respects. This preliminary result moves the debate forward relative to the general and necessary conflict suggested by the relational and liberal understandings.
The proposed understandings further suggest that even though multiculturalism and secularism under some circumstances may have the same objects, namely religious groups, practices and claims, it does not follow from this that the normative claims of the two positions necessarily conflict -this depends on how the two understandings are fleshed out in terms of values, interests, aims and derived normative implications. So the proposed understandings move the debate from a focus on abstract positions articulated in metaphorical terms to more specific discussions about which particular normative claims follow from particular justifications.
The focus on structures of justification suggests a program for how these more specific questions should be addressed and investigated. The first step should be an investigation of the internal coherence of conceptions of multiculturalism and secularism focused on assessing at which conflicts might turn out to be merely apparent. 13 The second step should be a normative assessment of conceptions. Given that two conceptions do have incompatible implications, the question is whether they are plausible. This question calls for a standard reflective equilibrium discussion, where the plausibility of a conception is assessed on the basis of how the implications of the underlying principles square with considered judgments about other cases (Rawls, 1999) . At this point it might simply turn out that one of the conceptions involved in a conflict is implausible for other reasons.
The final step would be a constructive attempt at reinterpreting conceptions of multiculturalism and secularism which both are internally coherent and independently plausible, but which nevertheless have conflicting implications. Here the interpretative structure directs focus to whether there are alternative formulations of rights and rules that do not have conflicting implications.
All of these questions concern substantive normative argument, which the proposed formal structures do not answer. But the suggested understandings deliver a framework within which to ask the relevant questions and discuss the issues in a constructive way.
